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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. : 
FERNANDO GONZALEZ-CAMARGO,: Case No. 20110027-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2) (e) (2008). 
Appellant Fernando Gonzalez-Camargo was convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i) 
(2007), and theft by receiving stolen property, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (2008). R. 298-300. A copy of the judgment is in 
Addendum A. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Gonzalez-
Camargo constructively possessed methamphetamine located in a metal box in a 
bedroom that was not solely occupied by Gonzalez-Camargo and there was no additional 
evidence establishing a sufficient nexus between Appellant and the methamphetamine. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Standard of Review. When the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial is 
challenged, the standard of review requires that the "evidence and the reasonable 
inferences which may be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the jury verdict." State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989). A jury verdict can 
be reversed for insufficient evidence where the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." Id; see also State v. 
Robbins, 2009 UT 23, \\A, 210 P.3d 288. The "trial court's interpretation of binding 
case law [presents] a question of law" that is reviewed for correctness. State v. Stewart, -
~P.3d—, 2011 WL 2276499, \6. And, "when it is apparent that there is not sufficient 
competent evidence as to each element of the crime charged for the fact-finder to find, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime," the conviction must 
be overturned. State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79,1J12, 985 P.2d 911 
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 346:112-115; 241-50. See Addendum B 
containing record relevant to the preservation of this issue. 
Issue II: Whether admission of a university police officer's multiple hearsay 
testimony that he had read a report indicating that a computer had been stolen from a 
department in the university and other university records violated the rules of evidence 
and Appellant's right to confrontation, requiring a new trial. 
Standard of Review: The "standard of review on the admissibility of hearsay 
evidence is complex[.]" State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66,lfl0, 122 P.3d 639. This Court 
reviews "the legal questions to make the determination of admissibility for correctness." 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Id It reviews any factual findings that may have been made for clear error, and reviews 
the "district court's ruling on admissibility for abuse of discretion." Id. Moreover, 
"[m]atters of constitutional interpretation are questions of law5' that are reviewed for 
correctness," and "[t]he district court's decision to admit testimony that may implicate 
the confrontation clause is also a question of law reviewed for correctness." State v. 
Poole, 2010 UT 25,1J8, 232 P.3d 519. 
Preservation: The hearsay issue is preserved at R. 346:36-45, contained in 
Addendum C. The confrontation claim can be reviewed for plain error. State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1202, 1203 (Utah 1993). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of the following is in Addendum D: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i) (2007); 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (2007); 
Rules 801, 803, Utah Rules of Evidence; 
U.S. Const, amend. VI, XIV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Gonzalez-Camargo with three counts: possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony; receiving stolen 
property with a value exceeding $5,000, a second degree felony; and possession of a 
weapon by a restricted person, a third degree felony. Following preliminary hearing, the 
State moved to consolidate this case with that of Jovalee Lucero who was charged with 
the same counts. R. 54-61. The trial court denied the motion. R. 66. 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A jury trial was held on June 29-30, 2010. R. 182-83, 232-33. The State failed to 
put on evidence indicating that the controlled substance was possessed with intent to 
distribute or that the allegedly stolen property had a value exceeding $300. The trial 
court therefore granted Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on those elements, and 
sent the case to the jury on charges of possession of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, receiving stolen property, a class B misdemeanor, and possession of a weapon by 
a restricted person, a second degree felony. R. 238-39. 
The jury acquitted Gonzalez-Camargo of possessing the sawed off shotgun found 
in the closet of a bedroom that was not solely occupied by Appellant, in a house occupied 
by numerous people. R. 234. It convicted him of possession of methamphetamine 
located in a metal box in that bedroom and receiving stolen property based on a computer 
found in the bedroom. R. 234. 
Following trial and before sentencing, Appellant filed a motion to correct the 
record to reflect the trial court's order granting a directed verdict on the "intent to 
distribute" element of the possession charge and also on reduction of the theft by 
receiving charge to a class B misdemeanor. R. 238-39. The trial court granted that 
motion. R. 259. 
Gonzalez-Camargo also filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
and to arrest judgment, asking that the verdict be set aside because the State failed to 
prove that Gonzalez-Camargo constructively possessed the methamphetamine. R. 248-
50; reply 269-77. The trial judge denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. R. 291-94. 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
)ci eii.rK: i). „.wi'';. me nidi court sentenced Appellant to serve 365 days in the 
• . - • n . s . • - - - • . 
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a petition for certificate of probable cause, 
which the trial judge denied R "M* ; *»>o.. * ° TP Appellant is being held in the Salt 
I ake County J ail 
S I A I EMEN" I OF I HEFAC I S 
Agents from, the Attorney General's office conducted surveillance on two 
apartment* in ° fi-m p!e\ ai $ \ \ North Riverside Drive r.n the afternoon of September °9, 
2009 ' I h .*r , . . - . . ' . * • 
involving two different sellers outside the four-plex. R. J45.± lfc. " I ^X, ?iu , People 
involved in 1h ^e liand lo hand druii IransaJimis came out of the upstairs apart n= *nh- H.t 
•*• J * whemer iievcameonu-t \panmei t b -\ *-
Officers did nut dcUmi •! •"• • . • . . - • t 
not know who they were, R, }4 5:15!-- I euuinony did not indicate that Gonzalez-
Camargo was involved in the transactions or even present. 
Officers also observed ^ :rai ioi is indi » id"' >'« ^ome of wl 10m arri\ ed oi I bike s, ei iter 
the four-plex. R 345:202, These individuals oiion had backpacks or bags and some 
would later exit without the backpacks or bags. R ^15:^0 * People also exited the four-
plex and .ippjd'iH lied win* k , mi ilL" i inilli nheu- llic\ engaged in hi it: I eonversai-mis iv n 
returned to the apartments. R. 345:202. In addition, officers sa:\ v peoj >Ie thej 
characterized as "lookouts" and "at various times an individual would come out and 
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begin to walk the neighborhood on a cell phone." R. 245:203. Gonzalez-Camargo was 
not identified as being involved in any of these incidents. 
Late in the evening of September 29, 2009, officers also stopped and searched a 
vehicle that had left the residence. R. 345:187. They found a number of electronics and 
construction tools in the car, but let the driver go. R. 345:188. It was unclear from the 
testimony whether the driver was Angel Ovieda Orio or Alejandro Ramirez. R. 242; 
345:187-89. 
Agents arrived at the four-plex at about 10:15 p.m. in anticipation of executing a 
search warrant on Apartments B and D. R. 345:117, 123, 124, 186. Shortly after 
midnight on September 30, 2009, a large SWAT team began execution of the search 
warrant; there "was a great number of people there" so rather than execute the search 
warrant in Apartments B and D "in a normal fashion where they kick in the door and 
enter," the SWAT team used a bullhorn to "call[ ] the residents of the entire apartment 
building outside." R. 345:124, 171, 187. Twelve to fourteen people emerged and were 
placed on the curb. R. 345:121, 232. Several of the individuals on the curb lived in the 
apartment building. R. 345:171. Officers either arrested the people on the curb or found 
out where they lived and released them. R. 345:171. 
The SWAT team, which included dozens of agents, then entered and spent about 
an hour securing Apartments B and D. R. 345:121, 159, 160. The SWAT team had at 
least one canine unit and asked the agents "not to enter until the canine was done." R. 
345:209. While the SWAT team was inside, there was continued foot traffic to 
apartments in the four-plex. R. 345:160. The agents watched from a distance, then 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
entered the premises about thirty minutes to an hour after the SWAT team. R. 345:123, 
Metcalf, and the two agents were unsure who had been inside the apartment before them 
R 345:171, 190 No SWAT k-am members testified. 
A ppel • , esiKJici. ^ i-u/cuw ^amargo was one of the people removed from 
the four-plex while the agents entered and searched the apartments. R. 345:130, 1.72. 
Jovalee Lucero, who was also arrested, was one of the people on the - ur^ F "- ": 1? c 
R. 3 4 J . 1 6 1 . Another officer testified that iic had ^een A:*'\*Iidiit in the vicinity of the 
apartments in early August, 2008, R. 346:60-61. nl. Agent Spann talked to Gonzalez-
Camargo when he was on the curb ana neipea m ^ v .-.J. .^udiileruu ii>eaii»» ' 
345:22'* * A ' . • " i . ^ - . .:
 : • r — 
Gonzalez-Camargo, who could speak English unlike many of ilic occupants, asked 
the officers questions about what was going on. R 345:258; 346:80. He asked whether 
IhiTc SMIS -i pnihlrm m ill llir afllaTs wore l»i(i!\inj.» IOI some* me R U^ MO I Ik 
requested that he be allowed to speak to an officer. R. 345:259. According to Agent 
Spann, Gonzalez-Camargo identified himself as a resident of \par1mcnt D, and said :-
In nl iiiMKh' \Mlh Ins IMHIIIIU'IHI JIHI nth com mini abut - . .• ai-being. .. * > :). 
Appellant testified, however, that he did not tell officers 1 le II eel Iiitl le apart m = i it R. 
346:94 Gonzalez-Camargo5s girlfriend was also arrested. R. 345:260. 
7 
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When Agent Call entered the northwest bedroom of Apartment D over an hour 
after the SWAT team, he observed an open black metal box on the bed. R. 345:126. The 
box contained nine baggies of methamphetamine and a few baggies of marijuana; 
although boxes containing drugs are often locked, this one was unlocked when Agent 
Call entered the bedroom. R. 345:126, 162. Plastic baggies, a scale, and a meth pipe 
were also in the room, but there were no customer lists or receipts. R. 345:127, 128. In 
addition, a sawed-off shotgun was in the closet, leaning against the wall, and laptops and 
a couple of car stereos were on the floor. R. 345:127, 128. The clothing was not hanging 
in front of the shotgun when he entered but could have been moved by other officers. R. 
345:162. Because Agent Call entered the bedroom after the SWAT team and others, he 
did not know whether the items in the bedroom had been moved by other officers. R. 
345:161. 
When Agent Metcalf entered the bedroom to process evidence, the box with 
methamphetamine was on the floor next to a mattress. R. 345:174. The closet was 
"pretty full" and contained several computers stacked next to each other and clothing for 
adult men and women along with children's clothing that still had tags. R. 345:174, 175, 
178. One of the computers had a Utah State University sticker attached to it. R. 345:179. 
Agent Metcalf also found cameras, two video recorders, and several cell phones in the 
northwest bedroom. R. 345:181. One of the cellphones had a picture of Agent Metcalf s 
eleven year old neighbor on the screen. R. 345:182. Agent Metcalf testified that he 
showed the phone to his neighbor and asked whether it was his, but the State presented 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
no testimony from,, the neighbor or anyone else regarding the response to this question. 
I lie metal box was in a different place, on a chair surrounded by cell phones that 
were ringing when Agent T nee\ entered tin room R ^ ' ' ?f!-. ?0:T The dm 
cellpl lones w ei eon • .• : . • ,:*.;; .. :..-,*...;. ... ,, >*;.„;: > IIKH, 
the SWAT team, at least one ;m<l possibl\ (wo e.'imiie ntnl,, .uitl milter imesligalt rs Iiuin 
the Attorney General's office had been mil e bedroom, R. 345:204. Agent Lucey was in 
the apartment for several hours and testified that the cell phones continued to ring 
as to where the cell phones or metal box had been found. Clothes were still in the room, 
but many had been moved to the bed. R , 345:205. The ji},a\U did no* MCC compter 
n lani mis ci istomei lists, w ork space, business cards or a license in Gonzalez-Camargo' 's 
n a m e^ o r c o m p U t e r repair tools. R. 345:184, 2()6. ?,IS. 
The State showed a video of an officer walking through the apartment. See State's 
Exh 6 It is unclear at what poiu, n .r^ ^t.iifi Uus vide*- A ^ taken, A portion of the 
• i i / . • ' •• • • • • . K -
shown on : K h.-i* m ibe roan: and the metal box i$ closed and on the bed. ii> uic end, 
four cellphones are in the chair and the contents of the room had again been disturbed 
I IK1 vidm also shows Ihe rieoed rmMnl box in one pliee niid Llet nio\ ed R, 34 > ]}L); 
Exh. 6. Agent Spann testified that the box had monev. pjrkanes of meth an inn ctamine, 
and packages of marijuana. R ,345:239. 
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The video also shows a number of women's belongings in the northwest bedroom 
including purses, clothing, jewelry, perfume, makeup, and a jewelry box. Exh. 6. 
Identification for the woman sitting on the couch was found in the northwest bedroom, 
and that woman's purse was also in the bedroom. R. 345:87-88. 
The State did not present the testimony of any of the SWAT team members who 
initially entered the bedroom, nor did it present any testimony from the person who first 
found the metal box. R. 244. The State therefore did not establish where the metal box 
was found. 
The agents also found items in the southwest bedroom. Those included a drug 
pipe, baggies, and a fraudulent permanent resident card. R. 345:163; Exh. 6. They found 
a paystub for Raoul in that bedroom, and various electronics. R. 345:234; Exh. 6. 
Gonzalez-Camargo testified that Raoul lived in Apartment D. R. 346:97. 
Officers found electronics in the hall closet and a social security card in the toilet 
with the name Marco Antonio Gurrollo. Exh. 6; R. 345:17. Additionally, agents found 
items, including a firearm, in Apartment B. R. 345:192-93. 
After securing the premises and investigating for a while, officers brought fourteen 
people "back into their apartment, and then the interview process and the identity of folks 
continued at that time." R. 345:232, 129. Agent Call interviewed Raoul inside the 
apartment. R. 345:130. Various agents also interviewed Appellant after officers moved 
him back inside Apartment D. R. 345:130, 232. 
When agents carrying computers that came from the northwest bedroom walked 
by Appellant, Gonzalez-Camargo asked where the officers were going with his 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
computers. R 345:101, 20 1 , 232. Gonzalez-Camargo told the officers that he repaired 
llic eninpulcPi lor nlhcr peopk lli.il In: hvoil r mil pule in I n J II nn\ iind llial I he 
computers were not stolen. R. 345:208, 232; 346:21, 84. Spann testified that v * -n/;^ -
Camargo gestured toward the northwest bedroom and saul thai the computers were m his 
I >edrooi n R 345:233 But on cross-examination, Npa;*.. *ek i^Ak, ,^ ii,ai »•»- xport 
did not include a statement from Appellant that it was his bedroom. R. 345:2^",". in laet, 
nowhere in Agent Spann's report did he say that Gonzaliez-Camargo indicated that the 
-* , . .. the 
h.elii;iiiiai} hearing that AppelioiiL had saiu that iic lived m the apailnient or u <i ah 
that the northwest bedroom was his. R. 346:22. Gonzalez-Camargo testified that he did 
*! icci • . -c apartment ai id denied li\ ing there R 346: 5 I 
Agent Call testilicd IK;* hv »VT ,rned a < 
the laptops "belonged to hdward Wright." R. 3 -15.13 i. /.iter defence counsel objccteu, 
the agent testifiei* u*m ine computer was returned to John Amtoft. F ^ 4 5:13A y"eitlir-
detective w ith the Utah State University police department testified over defense 
objection that he was "familiar with a matter involving a stolen laptop a laptop stolen 
that the computer was university properly, and through police ivpnrl'. Illi.il l he i uinpuh i in 
question was stolen, F 316:^ \ H\ 40 ** The State did not present any testimony from 
*,: ., .\ :• :;.v computer was stolen. 
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The defense presented evidence indicating that Appellant did not live in the 
apartment. Gonzalez-Camargo testified that he had lived at a West Valley City address 
with his family since 2008, and was living at that address on September 30, 2009. R. 
346:72. He introduced bills with his name and the West Valley City address on them. R. 
346:73; Exh. 3, 4. These included a letter from Granite Credit Union and a bill from 
Select Health. R. 346:74. He testified that he had never lived in the apartment, but knew 
people who lived there. R. 346:74. He did not receive mail at the Riverside apartment. 
R. 346:78. He did store a bag of clothes in the apartment because he did not have room 
in his house. R. 346:77-78. He did not keep other things there. R. 346:78. 
Gonzalez-Camargo's sister, Rafaela, also testified that Appellant lived with her in 
West Valley City. R. 346:71. He had lived at the West Valley City house since sometime 
in 2008, and had not lived at another location during that time. R. 346:71. 
As part of the defense case, Gonzalez-Camargo testified that he had cash on his 
person that night and was paid in cash when he sold his car. R. 346:81. The State did not 
present evidence that Gonzalez-Camargo had cash as part of its case. Johnny Hernandez 
testified that he purchased Appellant's '63 Chevy Impala for $2500 on September 8, 
2009. R. 346:269. He paid cash. R. 346:270. 
The man who lived in Apartment B repaired computers and people brought their 
computers to him. R. 346:77. Sometimes Gonzalez-Camargo helped with the repairs, 
using the other man's tools, or installed programs. R. 346:77. 
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Gonzalez-Camargo testified further that he had been visiting the apartments three 
or four times a week since sometime in 2008. R. 346:75, 98. He stayed there about once 
a week. R. 346:96. People got together at the apartment to do things like eat meals 
prepared by one of the occupants who was a good cook, play darts, and watch soccer. R 
346:76. Twelve or more people lived in the apartment, but others visited. R. 346:76. 
Sixteen or seventeen people were in the apartments on the night of the search, drinking 
beers and watching a soccer game. R. 346:79. Appellant testified that he had arrived 
about 2:00 or 3:00 p.m. that afternoon, and had not brought anything with him. R. 
346:78-79. 
The jury acquitted Gonzalez-Camargo of possessing the gun found in the closet. It 
convicted him of constructively possessing the methamphetamine found in the metal box 
and possessing stolen property. R. 234. This appeal follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The conviction for possession of a controlled substance should be overturned and 
an acquittal entered because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
sufficient nexus existed between Gonzalez-Camargo and the methamphetamine found in 
a metal box in a room that he did not solely occupy. The bedroom where the metal box 
was located was occupied by a female whose belongings and identification were found in 
the room. The only belongings even arguably attributable to Appellant were men's 
clothing and computers found in the closet. Even if this were enough to establish that 
Gonzalez-Camargo stayed in the room on occasion, the State failed to introduce 
additional evidence which is necessary to prove the requisite nexus. The State failed to 
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introduce evidence as to where exactly the metal box was found or whether it was open, 
closed or locked. Rather than presenting testimony from the officers who found the box, 
the State used officers who arrived later and saw the metal box in several different 
locations. Hence, the metal box could have been hidden among the woman's personal 
belongings, and there is no evidence that it was comingled with male belongings or that 
Appellant even knew about it. 
None of the factors that are usually considered in combination to establish 
constructive possession existed in this case - Gonzalez-Camargo was not present when 
the drugs were found, the drugs were not in open view, the State did not establish that he 
had access to the drugs, he was not in proximity to the drugs, there was no evidence of 
mutual use and enjoyment of the drugs, and there were no statements or behavior that 
incriminated Gonzalez-Camargo in regard to the methamphetamine. Under the evidence 
presented, it is just as likely if not more so, that someone other than Gonzalez-Camargo 
possessed the methamphetamine found in the metal box, and Appellant knew nothing 
about it. The evidence is sufficiently inconclusive, requiring that the conviction be 
reversed. 
The conviction for receiving stolen property should also be reversed and the 
matter remanded for a new trial on this count because the State relied on inadmissible 
hearsay to establish that the property was stolen. The inadmissible hearsay testimony of 
a detective that he had reviewed stolen property reports and university records to verify 
that the computer was stolen did not fit within the business records exception, as the 
judge incorrectly ruled, since the State did not introduce the records themselves, police 
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reports are not business records, the State did not lay the foundation for the exception, 
and the detective was not the custodian of the records or otherwise qualified. In addition 
to violating the rules of evidence, the hearsay testimony violated Gonzalez-Camargo's 
right to confrontation. The error was prejudicial because the State did not otherwise 
establish that the property was stolen. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE STATE PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH THAT GONZALEZ-CAMARGO CONSTRUCTIVELY 
POSSESSED METHAMPHETAMINE FOUND IN A METAL BOX IN A 
BEDROOM THAT APPELLANT DID NOT SOLELY OCCUPY. 
While the State need not prove actual possession of a controlled substance in order 
to convict, the State must nevertheless introduce sufficient evidence to establish a "nexus 
between the accused and the drug" sufficient enough to allow "an inference that the 
accused had both the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the 
drug.55 State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). The State failed to establish that 
Gonzalez-Camargo constructively possessed the methamphetamine located in the 
northwest bedroom of one of the apartments where it failed to link Appellant to the 
methamphetamine, failed to establish where the methamphetamine was originally found, 
and otherwise failed to show that Gonzalez-Camargo had the ability and intent to 
exercise dominion and control over the contraband located in a metal box. In this case 
where someone other than Gonzalez-Camargo occupied and dominated the northwest 
bedroom, it is not clear where the drugs were found, the drugs were not visible, 
Gonzalez-Camargo did not make incriminating statements or engage in incriminating 
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behavior regarding the methamphetamine or drug use, and nothing linked Appellant to 
the metal box or the methamphetamine inside the box, the State failed to sustain its 
burden of proving constructive possession. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) makes it unlawful "for any person knowingly 
and intentionally to possess or use . . . a controlled substance." "Actual physical 
possession is not a required element of the crime of possession of controlled substance." 
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1987). Instead, the State can satisfy the 
possession element of the crime by proving that the defendant had constructive 
possession of the drugs. Id. at 131-32. But to establish constructive possession, the State 
must prove that the "contraband was found in a place or under circumstances indicating 
that the accused had the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over it." 
Id. at 132; see also Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61,f7, 975 P.2d 501 
(indicating evidence must establish that defendant "had both the ability and the intent to 
exercise dominion and control over the drug") (further citation omitted). 
In order to establish constructive possession, the State must do more than establish 
"mere occupancy of a portion of the premises where the drug is found." Hansen, 732 
P.2d at 132. In fact, both the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have made it clear that 
the evidence must do more than show ownership or mere occupancy and instead must 
establish a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the contraband to show "that the 
accused had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the 
drug." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319; see also Hansen, 732 P.2d at 131-32; State v. Layman, 1999 
UT 79, 985 P.2d 911; State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In other 
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words, besides mere occupancy, "[t]here must be some additional nexus between the 
accused and the contraband to show that the accused had the power and intent to exercise 
dominion and control over it." Hansen, 732 P.2d at 132; see also Layman, 1999 UT 79, 
f 13. "The sufficiency of the nexus between defendant and the [contraband] depends upon 
the facts and circumstances of the case," Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388 (citation omitted), and 
"[t]here must be facts which show that the accused intended to use the drugs or 
paraphernalia as his own." Layman, 1999 UT 79, ^ [13. 
Knowledge of the existence of the drugs "and their potential for illegal use" also is 
not sufficient to establish constructive possession. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, f 7. 
"Knowledge and ability to possess do not equal possession where there is no evidence of 
intent to make use of that knowledge and ability." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. 
The supreme court's decision in Fox illustrates the level of evidence necessary to 
establish this additional nexus between the defendant and the contraband. In that case, 
the supreme court held that the State failed to establish that Clive Fox constructively 
possessed the contraband found in a house he shared with his brother, Gary, while also 
holding that the evidence was sufficient to establish constructive possession by Gary. In 
reaching its decision, the Court recognized that some of the factors "which might 
combine to show a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug are:" incriminating 
statements or behavior, "presence of the drugs in a specific area over which the accused 
had control, such as a closet or drawer containing the accused's clothing or other personal 
effects," or "presence of drug paraphernalia among the accused's personal effects or in a 
place over which the accused has special control." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. The Court 
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concluded that the evidence established a sufficient nexus between Gary Fox and the 
marijuana plants where (1) he owned the house, (2) his personal effects were in the same 
room as contraband and a book on growing marijuana, and (3) greenhouses containing 
contraband were built onto his house, giving rise to a "reasonable inference that he not 
only knew of the greenhouses and their contents but also had the power and intent to 
exercise dominion and control over the marijuana located in them." Id. at 320. 
By contrast, the evidence did not establish constructive possession by Clive Fox. 
While the Court concluded that Clive knew marijuana was being grown in the house, 
more than mere knowledge was required to prove that he intended to exercise dominion 
and control over the contraband. Id. In fact, "evidence supporting the theory of 
'constructive possession' must raise a reasonable inference that the defendant was 
engaged in a criminal enterprise and was not simply a bystander." Id. Although the 
evidence showed that Clive lived in the house where marijuana was being grown, the 
room that was apparently his sleeping quarters had no marijuana or paraphernalia,, 
Because there was no evidence other than a showing that Clive was involved in growing 
the plants, the Court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Clive 
constructively possessed the marijuana being grown in the house where he lived. Id. 
The supreme court likewise concluded that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish constructive possession in Layman. In that case, the contraband was found in a 
waistband pouch of a woman who was in the car defendant was driving. Although 
Layman knew the drugs were in the pouch and "shook his head in a negative fashion" 
after the woman looked at him when the officer asked to search the pouch, the evidence 
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failed to establish that he "had such control over [the woman's] person that one could 
reasonably infer beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and intentionally 
possessed the drugs and paraphernalia in her pouch." Id, at T}16. In fact, the Court 
clarified that "[n] either her presence in his vehicle, his erratic behavior after the traffic 
stop, nor his use of drugs at some earlier time" were sufficient to establish the required 
nexus. Id. And, although not one fact is determinative, the Layman court "reiterated 
several factors to consider when determining whether constructive possession of a 
controlled substance exists . . . . " Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, [^8, citing Layman, 953 P.2d at 
788. Those factors include: 
"(1) defendant's presence at the time the drugs were found, with emphasis 
on the fact that the drugs were in plain or open view; (2) the defendant's 
access to the drugs; (3) the proximity of the defendant to the drugs; (4) 
evidence indicating that the 'defendant was participating with others in the 
mutual use and enjoyment of the contraband; and (5) incriminating 
statements." 
Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, f 8 (further citations omitted). 
This Court reached a similar conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish constructive possession in State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
In that case, officers had received a tip that Salas would be driving a certain vehicle and 
was in possession of cocaine. Id. at 1387. They stopped the vehicle, which was being 
driven by Salas and was occupied by a "passenger in the front seat and one in the 
backseat." Id, Officers searched the car, which was co-owned by Salas and his wife, and 
found cocaine "in the crack of the backseat on the driver's side, where the bottom of the 
cushion fits the back." Id, The passenger in the backseat was seated behind the front seat 
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passenger, but had been seated behind the driver and moved when the car was stopped. 
Id. This Court concluded that the facts failed to prove that Salas constructively possessed 
the cocaine, stating "[t]his furtive movement, coupled with the fact that the cocaine was 
found under the backseat where the passenger had been sitting, renders the remaining 
evidence sufficiently inconclusive as to whether the defendant knew of the presence of 
the cocaine or had intent to exercise dominion and control over the cocaine." Id. 
In reaching the decision in Salas, this Court reiterated that mere presence in the 
premises or vehicle where contraband is located is not enough to establish constructive 
possession where occupancy is not exclusive. Id. Where a defendant is not the sole 
occupant and does not have sole access to contraband, additional evidence is required in 
order to establish constructive possession. Id. Such additional evidence did not exist 
under the circumstances in Salas. 
The factual evidence in this case, however, is inconclusive as to 
whether defendant knew of or possessed cocaine. Although defendant 
owned and occupied the vehicle, the ownership and occupancy were not 
exclusive. Defendant's wife was a co-owner of the vehicle and there were 
two passengers in the vehicle at the time of the arrest. One passenger had 
better access to the spot where the cocaine was found than did defendant. 
Further, defendant denied the presence of cocaine before the search, did not 
try to escape the scene during the search, denied putting the cocaine in the 
vehicle after it was discovered, and did not have drugs or drug 
paraphernalia on his person at the time of the arrest. The drug itself was 
found in an area that was not easily accessible to the defendant. There had 
been a backseat passenger close to where the drug was found, and this 
passenger was seen moving around in a furtive manner just before the 
traffic stop. In addition, the statement spontaneously uttered by defendant 
that "they put it there" lends further support to the assertion that defendant 
did not exercise control over the cocaine. Neither [officer] testified that 
defendant carried a package to his vehicle, talked suspiciously with other 
passengers, was in the back seat or reached to the back seat, or that 
defendant's behavior was suspicious in anyway. 
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Id. at 1389. Because the evidence failed to establish a connection between Salas and the 
cocaine that proved he had knowledge of the cocaine and the intent and ability to exercise 
dominion and control over it, this Court reversed the conviction. Id. at 1340. 
This Court's decision in Bryan likewise held that the State failed to establish 
constructive possession of items seized in defendant's home. In reaching that decision, 
this Court considered a number of factors including: 
First, defendant was not present at the time the items were found. 
Second, although defendant may have had access to the items found in her 
home, there is no evidence that she used or intended to use the items for 
illegal purposes. Third, there was no evidence that defendant participated in 
the mutual use of the items seized. Lastly, defendant made no statements, 
incriminating or otherwise. 
Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, TJ9. This Court "agree[d] with defendant's argument that the 
fact that she lived in a house with her husband where the items were found '"is as fully 
explained by her attachment to her husband as it might be by a control over the [items 
seized.]'"" Id. (further citations omitted). And, this Court emphasized that "neither 
possibilities nor probabilities can substitute for certainty beyond a reasonable doubt" and 
also that "[i]n cases relying on constructive possession, [the State's] burden requires a 
presentation of extensive and detailed facts." Id. at TflO. 
By contrast, the State established sufficient evidence of constructive possession in 
circumstances where the contraband is directly linked to the defendant. See, e.g., 
Hansen, 732 P.2d at 131-32; Workman, 2005 UT 66,1fi[29-35. For example, in Hansen, 
the evidence was sufficient where the contraband was found in a metal box "stashed" 
under the defendant's clothing, the metal box was locked with defendant's lock, the 
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defendant lied and denied that he had the key even though it was in his pants pocket, and 
drug scales were on defendant's bookshelf. Hansen, 132 P.2d at 132. In that case, 
defendant clearly occupied the room since officers entered when he was still sleeping in 
his bed. Id. at 127. The evidence in addition to occupancy directly linked him to the 
contraband since it was in his bedroom, found under a pile of his dirty laundry, and he 
had a key to the box containing the contraband. Id. at 132. 
And in Workman, the totality of the circumstances also established a sufficient 
nexus between defendant and the clandestine lab found in the bedroom she occupied with 
another. Workman, 2005 UT 66, ^ [35. Workman's personal items, including day planner, 
driver's license, and identification were intermingled on a shelf with "a Tupperware-type 
container holding pills and a plastic container holding a meth pipe and glass loading rod;" 
her fingerprint was on the Tupperware container. Id. at ffl[3, 34. She made statements 
"that could imply that she had a guilty conscience," and "admitted to buying some of the 
containers and glassware that were being used in the lab." Id. at f34. And, "she admitted 
to previous drug use, including meth use." Id. Although the Court recognized that 
"[t]aken alone, it is not likely that any one, or even a small group, of these factors would 
be enough to establish a sufficient nexus between Workman and the clandestine lab," 
"the cumulative effect of these factors" created the sufficient nexus. Id. at T[35; see also 
State v. Martin, 2011 UT App 112, 251 P.3d 860 (holding evidence established a 
sufficient nexus to prove constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt where 
contraband was found in the backseat of police car where defendant had been the sole 
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occupant, the drags were found where defendant had been seated, and defendant had 
moved around in the backseat). 
The evidence in this case failed to establish constructive possession since it failed 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt a nexus between the methamphetamine in the metal 
box and Gonzalez-Camargo "sufficient enough to allowr an inference that Gonzalez-
Camargo had both the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the 
drug." The marshaled evidence is as follows: 
1. Gonzalez-Camargo was present in the apartments, along with at least a dozen 
other people, shortly after midnight when officers executed the search warrant. 
R. 345:123, 160,227. 
2. Appellant talked with officers while being detained outside. He asked whether 
there was a problem or if the officers were looking for someone. R. 345:121, 
161,228,258. 
3. Agent Spann testified that Gonzalez-Camargo asked about the welfare of his 
girlfriend and told him that he lived with his girlfriend in Apartment D. R. 
345:228-29. He also testified that after he was inside, Gonzalez-Camargo 
gestured toward the northwest bedroom, indicating it was his. R. 345:233-34. 
4. When Agent Call entered the premises, the metal box containing contraband 
was on the bed in the northwest bedroom. R. 345:126. He thought there was 
also a meth pipe. R. 345:126. But he and the other agents with the Attorney 
General's office entered the bedroom over an hour after the SWAT team 
members and at least one canine unit had gone through the apartment, and did 
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not know whether the items had been moved, where they had been originally 
located, or whether the metal box was locked. R. 345:161, 248. There was no 
testimony from the person who first located the metal box or meth pipe 
indicating this information. 
5. Agent Call testified that plastic baggies, a scale, and a meth pipe were also 
found. R. 345:127, 128. 
6. Men's clothing was found in the northwest bedroom. R. 345:174, 175, 178. 
The officers also found computers in that bedroom. R. 345: 174, 175, 178. 
Cellphones were also ultimately located in the bedroom but it is unclear 
precisely where they were found. R.345:181. 
7. Agents testified that when they walked past Gonzalez-Camargo carrying 
computers, Appellant asked where they were going with his computers and 
gestured toward the northwest bedroom, saying the computers were his. R. 
345:207, 232, 233. They said Appellant told them that he repaired computers 
for a living and the computers were not stolen. R. 345:208, 232; 346:21, 84. 
8. Gonzalez-Camargo's girlfriend was also arrested. An officer testified that he 
thought only one woman was arrested. R. 346:88. A woman who was being 
detained asked for a specific item out of her purse; that purse was in the 
northwest bedroom. R. 346:88. The room contained purses, a jewelry box, and 
women's clothing. Exh. 6 
This marshaled evidence is even less compelling than the evidence linking 
defendants to the contraband in Salas, Clive Fox, Bryan, and Layman, where Utah 
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appellate courts have held that the State's evidence failed to prove a sufficient nexus 
between the defendant and the contraband. The evidence therefore failed to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Gonzalez-Camargo constructively possessed the 
contraband found in the metal box. 
None of the factors relied on in establishing constructive possession are present in 
this case. In fact, regardless of whether the evidence established that Gonzalez-Camargo 
occupied the bedroom with his girlfriend, there is no additional evidence linking him to 
the methamphetamine found in the metal box. It is just as possible, if not more so, under 
the evidence presented in this case that the girlfriend or someone else possessed the 
methamphetamine. Under these circumstances, the State failed to prove that Gonzalez-
Camargo had the ability and intent to exercise dominion and control over the drugs. 
The only evidence linking Appellant to the northwest bedroom was the officers' 
testimony that he said he shared that room with his girlfriend and claimed that the 
computers found in that room were his, and men's clothing found in that room. R. 
345:233-34, 228-29, 207. But even if the evidence was sufficient to establish that 
Gonzalez-Camargo occupied the bedroom on occasion, that evidence did not link 
Gonzalez-Camargo to the methamphetamine in the metal box. Additional evidence was 
needed to establish the requisite nexus between Gonzalez-Camargo and the contraband; 
such additional evidence was not introduced. Because the State did not present additional 
evidence establishing a sufficient nexus, the conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance must be overturned. See Fox, 709 P.2d at 320. 
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As was the case in Salas, Layman, and Clive Fox, the evidence did not establish 
that Appellant was engaged in a criminal enterprise rather than a bystander. See Fox, 709 
P.2d at 320. The contraband was located in a metal box in a room dominated by female 
possessions and containing the identification of a female who was also arrested; very few 
male effects other than men's clothing were in the room, and it was not clear from the 
evidence whether the clothing was hanging in a closet or stored in a bag. Purses, 
perfume, makeup, and women's clothes were found throughout the room. Exh. 6. 
Because the State did not present evidence as to where exactly the metal box was found, 
the contraband could have been found wrapped in female clothing or a drawer with 
female possessions which would demonstrate that it belonged to someone other than 
Gonzalez-Camargo. In any event, there was no evidence that the contraband was found 
among male possessions or otherwise linked to Gonzalez-Camargo. Appellant did not 
have contraband or paraphernalia on him, and nothing else linked him to the metal box 
containing contraband. In all, the State failed to introduce evidence establishing that 
Gonzalez-Camargo intended to exercise dominion and control over the contraband; any 
other of the dozen or more people, including the female in whose room the contraband 
was located, could have been in possession. 
The factors often considered in determining whether a defendant constructively 
possessed contraband work against the State in this case. See, e.g., Bryan, 1999 UT App 
61,1J8; Layman, 953 P.2d at 788. In fact, none of those factors demonstrate that 
Gonzalez-Camargo constructively possessed the contraband. Considered together, the 
factors show that the State's evidence was so inconclusive that it failed to prove beyond a 
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reasonable doubt that Gonzalez-Camargo constructively possessed the 
methamphetamine. 
First, Gonzalez-Camargo was not present when officers found the 
methamphetamine. Like the other twelve or more people who had been inside the 
apartments when the SWAT team arrived, Gonzalez-Camargo was taken outside before 
officers entered the premises and began conducting the search. R. 345:121, 258, 232. 
There is no evidence that the drugs were in plain view when the search began or that 
Gonzalez-Camargo had seen the drugs. They were in a metal box that was closed when 
at least some of the officers saw it; it is not clear whether it was also locked. Since there 
is no evidence as to where the box was found or whether it was open, closed or locked, 
and Gonzalez-Camargo was outside when the metal box was located, the first factor 
weighs against a finding of constructive possession. In fact, it is as likely that the 
methamphetamine was locked up and hidden among female possessions or deposited in 
the bedroom by one of the many people exiting the apartments as it was that Gonzalez-
Camargo was aware of the existence of the meth and had the ability and intent to exercise 
dominion and control over it. 
The second factor also weighs against a finding of constructive possession since 
there is no evidence that Gonzalez-Camargo had access to the methamphetamine. By 
failing to introduce evidence as to where the metal box was found or evidence as to 
whether it was locked, the State failed to establish that Gonzalez-Camargo had access or 
that he used or intended to use the methamphetamine. See Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, \9. 
27 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The State likewise failed to prove that Gonzalez-Camargo was in close proximity 
to the methamphetamine for the same reasons. Even if it were reasonable to infer that 
Gonzalez-Camargo stayed over in the northwest bedroom, the State's evidence failed to 
prove that he had the ability to exercise dominion and control over the methamphetamine 
located in the metal box. The State needed to establish, among other things, where the 
drugs were found, whether the metal box was locked or open, and other evidence linking 
Gonzalez-Camargo to the methamphetamine in order to establish that Appellant 
constructively possessed the drugs. 
The evidence also failed to establish that Gonzalez-Camargo participated in the 
mutual use or enjoyment of the methamphetamine. Unlike Workman, there is no 
evidence the drugs were comingled with Appellant's belongings. See Workman, 2005 UT 
66, Tf32. The bedroom contained predominantly female belongings and there is no 
evidence the metal box was found among the men's clothing or computers that were 
being stored in the bedroom. Although officers testified that plastic baggies, a scale, and 
a pipe were also found, their testimony was unclear as to where those items were initially 
located. R. 345:127, 128. As was the case with the metal box containing 
methamphetamine, the officer who found these items did not testify and the State's 
failure to establish where these items were found precludes the State from linking them to 
Appellant since the pipe, baggies and scale could have been found among female 
possessions or inside the metal box. 
Finally, Gonzalez-Camargo did not make incriminating statements about the 
methamphetamine. Although the evidence shows he acknowledged that the computers 
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were his, he said nothing that showed he was aware of the drugs, let alone that would 
suggest that he intended to exercise dominion and control over them. In fact, his 
acknowledgment that he shared the northwest bedroom would suggest the opposite - that 
he was unaware that there were drugs in that room. 
As was the case in Bryan, "the factual evidence in this case is inconclusive as to 
whether [Gonzalez-Camargo] possessed the [methamphetamine]." Bryan, 1999 UT App 
61, \\ 1. Even if the evidence showed that Gonzalez-Camargo occupied the northwest 
bedroom, that evidence "'is as fully explained by [his] attachment to [his girlfriend] as it 
might be by a control over [the methamphetamine]." Id. at ^9 (further citations omitted). 
And, evidence in addition to occupancy is required to establish constructive possession. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d at 131-32; Layman, 1999 UT 79, f l3 . 
Like Salas, the evidence was "sufficiently inconclusive as to whether [Gonzalez-
Camargo] knew of the presence of the [meth] or had the intent to exercise dominion and 
control over [it]" because the room appeared to belong to a female, Gonzalez-Camargo's 
girlfriend was also charged, and there was a reasonable possibility under this evidence 
that someone other than Appellant possessed the meth. See Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388. 
And, like Layman, "there was little evidence to prove that [Gonzalez-Camargo] had such 
control over [the methamphetamine] that one could reasonably infer beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he knowingly and intentionally possessed the drugs." Layman, 1999 UT 79, 
If 16. This case was even weaker than Layman since there were no looks exchanged 
between Gonzalez-Camargo and his girlfriend and nothing indicating Appellant knew the 
metal box existed or that metal box had methamphetamine in it. 
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The drugs were not found among Gonzalez-Camargo's "personal effects or in a 
place over which [Gonzalez-Camargo] ha[d] special control." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. He 
made no statements that suggested drug involvement on his part and did not engage in 
behavior that suggested drug involvement. Gonzalez-Camargo's questions to officers 
were just as likely to have been caused by the fact that he spoke English or was 
concerned about his girlfriend, as they were by any concern about the apartments' 
contents. And, his willingness to talk with officers and say he shared the northwest 
bedroom with his girlfriend would suggest that he was unaware that drugs were in that 
room since it was evident that the large SWAT team and numerous officers were looking 
for contraband. Nor was paraphernalia or evidence of drug use or involvement found 
among Appellant's personal effects. Hence, the factors considered in Fox did not 
combine in this case to establish constructive possession. 
Because the State did not produce evidence establishing that Gonzalez-Camargo 
knew about the methamphetamine and had the ability and intent to exercise dominion and 
control over it, the State failed to establish constructive possession. In this case where it 
is just as likely that Gonzalez-Camargo did not know about the metal box or its contents 
or did not have the ability and intent to exercise dominion and control over the 
contraband, the State's evidence fails and the conviction for possession should be 
overturned. 
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POINT II. EVIDENCE OF POLICE REPORTS THAT THE COMPUTER HAD 
BEEN STOLEN WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED. 
Rather than calling the owner of the computer to testify that it had been stolen, the 
State relied solely on the hearsay testimony of a university police officer who testified 
that the computer had been reported stolen. This testimony was inadmissible hearsay. 
Because the State did not present any other evidence proving that this or any other item 
was stolen, the conviction for misdemeanor theft by receiving stolen property should be 
overturned.1 
A detective from the Utah State (USU) police department testified that he spoke 
with agents at the Attorney General's office who gave him the make, model, and serial 
number of a specific computer, then "verified that a computer was owned by the 
university." R. 346:37, 40, 48. The detective spoke with USU's equipment manager and 
"verified the information." R. 346:40-4. And he accessed USU records, including stolen 
property reports, and testified that the computer was reported stolen in those reports. R. 
346:44-45. Although defense counsel repeatedly objected to the hearsay testimony (R. 
346:36, 37, 38-40, 41, 43, 42, 44, 45), the trial court nevertheless admitted it, indicating 
that the stolen property reports were business records and the officer could testify 
1
 Agent Call's testimony that one of the laptops belonged to someone else and had been 
reported stolen (R. 345:134) was also inadmissible hearsay. Defense counsel objected 
and read in context, it appears that the objection was sustained. R. 345:134. But if it was 
not, it should have been since the statement was hearsay under Rule 802 and did not fit 
within the business records or any other exception. The inadmissibility of this hearsay 
was obvious, and although the testimony was not enough to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the computer was stolen, to the extent it contributed, it was prejudicial. Hence, 
even if counsel had not objected, the trial court would have plainly erred in admitting the 
testimony. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) (outlining test for 
plain error; see also infra at 34, 38, 43. 
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regarding those reports "if he's entitled to review those and utilize those in the ordinary 
course of business . . . , " and overruled counsel's objections that hearsay police reports are 
not admissible. R. 346:43. This ruling was contrary to the Rules of Evidence, case law, 
and Appellant's right to confrontation, and the erroneous admission of the evidence 
prejudiced Gonzalez-Camargo. 
A. The admission of hearsay testimony that the computer had been stolen violated 
the rules of evidence and requires that the conviction for receiving stolen 
property be overturned. 
Under the rules of evidence, "[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by 
law or by [the rules of evidence]." Utah R. Evid. 801. Hearsay is defined under the rules 
as "an oral or written assertion," or conduct if intended as an assertion, "other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R. Evid. 801. Although the rules of evidence do 
allow the admission of hearsay under certain limited exceptions, "[h]earsay statements 
have been generally discredited because they . . . lack trustworthiness" and also because 
"the person purporting to know the facts is not stating them under oath." State in the 
Interest ofK.D.S, 578 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah 1978). Moreover, even if evidence would 
otherwise be admissible under the rules of evidence, its admission is erroneous if it 
violates the defendant's right to confrontation. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 
50-51(2004). 
While hearsay is generally inadmissible, the rules of evidence allow its admission 
under certain limited circumstances. See Utah R. Evid. 803, 804, 807. Contrary to the 
trial court's ruling, however, this evidence did not fit within the business records 
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exception to the hearsay rule found in Utah R. Evid. 803(6). The improper admission of 
the hearsay evidence, which the State relied on to prove that property seized in the 
apartment had been stolen, affected the outcome of the receiving stolen property count, 
requiring reversal of that conviction. 
In this case, the prosecutor and trial court looked to the business record exception 
outlined in Rule 803(6). R. 346:38-39, 43. Rule 803 outlines the exceptions to the 
hearsay rule which apply regardless of whether the declarant is available, provides in part 
that records "kept in the course of a regularly conducted business" are admissible if the 
custodian of the records or other qualified witness establishes that it was "the regular 
practice of that business" to keep the record, and the record was "kept in the course of 
regularly conducted business." Utah R. Evid. 803(6). Hearsay evidence that fits within 
the following is not excluded, "even though the declarant is available as a witness." 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, 
record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or 
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a 
person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of 
the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 
902 (11), Rules 902(12), or a statute permitting certification unless the source of 
information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes, business, 
institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether 
or not conducted for profit. 
Utah R. Evid. 803(6). This exception was inapplicable not only because neither the 
records at issue nor the police officer qualified under the rule, but also because the 
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records themselves were not introduced and instead the officer testified regarding his 
memory of those records. 
As a starting place, the police officer's testimony regarding what the records said 
was not admissible under this rule since the rule provides only for the admission of the 
records themselves. Utah R. Evid. 803(6). The officer's testimony about what he had 
read multiplied the hearsay, making it untrustworthy and unreliable. The trial court 
therefore erred in allowing the officer to testify as to what he read based on this rule.2 
Additionally, the business records exception does not apply in this context even if 
the records themselves had been offered because police reports offered by the State in 
support of its prosecution are too unreliable to qualify under the rule. See Layton City v. 
Peronek, 803 P.2d 1294, 1297-98 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 118, 
1185-86 (Utah 1983). As this Court recognized in Peronek, the supreme court held in 
Bertul "that police reports made for the purpose of prosecuting an offense and offered by 
the prosecution lack sufficient reliability so as to be admissible under the business 
records exception." Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1297 {citing Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1184). This is 
because such reports are not made as part of regularly conducted business and are made 
with an eye toward prosecution, thereby undermining their reliability. See also 
2
 Admission of the detective's testimony regarding the contents of the records also 
violated the "best evidence rule" found in Rule 1002, Utah Rules of Evidence. See Rules 
1001-06, Utah Rules of Evidence; see also State v. Ross, 573 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1978) 
(reversing conviction under best evidence rule found in former Rule 70, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, where officer testified regarding contents of phone record). Although defense 
counsel did not object on these grounds, the error was obvious under Rule 1002 and case 
law, and it prejudiced Gonzalez-Camargo because no other evidence established that 
property was stolen. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993) (outlining test 
for plain error); discussion supra at 31; infra at 38. 
34 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusets, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2009) (indicating that documents 
do not qualify for federal business records exception where "the regularly conducted 
business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial.") 
Moreover, the business records exception does not apply here because the State 
did not meet the requirements for laying a foundation that would establish the reliability 
of those records. See Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1184. The supreme court outlined four factors 
that should generally be met in order to allow admission under the business records 
exception: 
(l)The record must be made in the regular course of the business or entity 
which keeps the records; (2) the record must have been made at the time of, 
or in close proximity to, the occurrence of the act, condition or event 
recorded; (3) the evidence must support a conclusion that after recordation 
the document was kept under circumstances that would preserve its 
integrity; and (4) the sources of the information from which the entry was 
made and circumstances of the preparation of the document were such as to 
indicate its trustworthiness. 
Id. The detective did not address any of these factors. In fact, the evidence gives no 
information as to how the records the detective reviewed were prepared or when they 
were made in proximity to the event. His testimony also did not support a determination 
that the integrity of the documents was preserved after recordation or that "the sources of 
the information from which the entry was made and the circumstances of the preparation 
of the document were such as to indicate its trustworthiness." See id. The detective's 
testimony regarding the university records he had reviewed was inadmissible not only 
because the records themselves were not being offered but also because the foundational 
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requirements under the business records exception were not met. See Peronek, 803 P.2d 
at 1297. 
And, the testimony regarding university records the detective reviewed was not 
admissible under the business records exception because the detective was not the 
custodian of the records or an otherwise qualified witness. As was the case in Peronek, 
the detective's testimony demonstrated that he was not the custodian of the records. See 
id. at 1298 (indicating police officer was not custodian of records of incidents reports or 
other qualified witness under business records exception where he "had no knowledge of 
the circumstances of the report's creation, and had no custodial responsibility for the 
report). The detective's testimony did not establish that he had knowledge of how the 
reports were prepared or custodial responsibility for them. The detective worked for the 
Utah State University Police Department. R. 346:35. In that capacity, he had access to 
records compiled by the university. R. 346:35-37. Based on that access and the ability 
"to review those and utilize those in the ordinary course of business," the trial court 
allowed the detective to testify regarding what he had read in stolen property reports. R. 
346:43, 44. But that is not what the rule requires. See Utah R. Evid. 803(6). Instead, it 
requires that a person with personal knowledge testify regarding whether the record was 
made in the course of regularly conducted business, the proximity to the event with 
which the record was made, details regarding the keeping of the record to ensure its 
integrity, and information regarding the sources of the information and the manner in 
which it was made, as outlined in BertuL 
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In fact, the court recognized in Bertul that "[generally, the requisite foundation 
can be made by the custodian of the records." Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1184. The fact that the 
detective did not testify as to any of the Bertul factors further demonstrates that he was 
not the custodian or otherwise qualified to testify as to how the records were made or 
kept. 
In all, the detective's testimony regarding records he had reviewed was 
inadmissible hearsay. It did not qualify under the business records exception since the 
records themselves were not admitted, he was not the custodian, the testimony did not 
establish the requisites for qualifying under the business records exception, and the 
records were police reports. The trial court therefore erred in admitting the records under 
the business records exception. 
The error in admitting the hearsay testimony requires that the conviction for 
receiving stolen property be overturned. Courts will overturn a conviction based on the 
erroneous admission of evidence where "there is a ' "reasonable likelihood that the error 
affected the outcome of the proceedings.'"" Workman, 2005 UT 66, TJ23 (further citations 
omitted). In this case, the detective's hearsay testimony was necessary to the State's case 
since it did not otherwise establish that the property was stolen. The State did not present 
3
 Nor does the testimony qualify under Rule 803(8)(B), Utah Rules of Evidence. First, 
the records themselves were not admitted so the exception found in Rule 803(8)(B) does 
not apply and, as outlined in footnote 1, the officer's testimony regarding the contents of 
the records also violated the best evidence rule. Second, the State failed to establish that 
the records were public records under the rule. Third, the exception excludes in criminal 
cases "matters observed by police officers and other lawr enforcement personnel," making 
the public records exception inapplicable. Hence the public records exception found in 
Rule 803(8)(B) does not provide an alternative grounds for affirmance in this case. 
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any witnesses who purported to own the computers found in the northwest bedroom. 
Instead, the State relied solely on this hearsay testimony regarding one of the computers 
to establish its charge that Gonzalez-Camargo committed theft by receiving stolen 
property. Without the testimony, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the computers were stolen. 
The only other evidence presented by the State that even touched on whether an 
item was stolen was itself objectionable and also was so weak that it could not sustain 
that element alone or withstand the fact that the error in allowing the detective to testify 
to the contents of reports requires reversal. Agent Call testified that "one of the laptops 
we recovered was reported stolen" and also that he had returned one of the laptops. R. 
345:133-34. Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds and read in context, it appears 
the trial court sustained that objection. R. 345:134. But even if the court did not sustain 
that objection it was error to allow that testimony for the same reasons it was error and 
also plain error to allow Detective Ellis's testimony. See plain error discussion supra at 
34, infra at 43. Agent Call's testimony indicating that the computer was reported stolen 
and returned was obviously hearsay that did not fit within an exceptions; it was 
prejudicial since the State did not present testimony from any of the owners that items 
found in the bedroom were stolen. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1203. Moreover, these 
statements were general and vague, and failed to tie the computer to one taken from the 
northwest bedroom or to Appellant. Even if Agent Call's testimony was admissible and 
considered, the error in admitting the detective's testimony affected the outcome and 
requires reversal because the State did not otherwise prove that a computer was stolen. 
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The Utah State sticker on the computer also did little to demonstrate that it was 
stolen. The computer could have been sold, on loan, or under repair. 
Nor did the State otherwise establish that Gonzalez-Camargo received stolen 
property based on other items found in the apartments. It failed to link the cellphones to 
Appellant and also failed to establish they were stolen. Although an officer testified that 
one of the cellphones had the picture of his neighbor's daughter, the State failed to 
present testimony from the owner of the cellphone establishing that it had been stolen 
rather than given away or sold. And, the State failed to establish in any way that 
Appellant actually or constructively possessed the phones. Hence the existence of a 
number of cellphones in the apartment did not prove the State's stolen property case 
against Gonzalez-Camargo. 
Under these circumstances where the hearsay testimony was the only evidence 
arguably demonstrating that property possessed by Appellant was stolen, the erroneous 
admission of the hearsay affected the outcome. A new trial on the stolen property count 
is required. 
B. Appellant's right to confrontation was also violated by the erroneous admission 
of the hearsay evidence. 
Allowing the detective to testify regarding police reports he had read also violated 
Gonzalez-Camargo's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. See Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The right to confrontation is a "bedrock procedural 
guarantee [that] applies to both federal and state prosecutions." Id. at 42. Regardless of 
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whether evidence is admissible under the rules of evidence, it can nevertheless violate a 
defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him. Id. at 50-51. 
"Statements taken by police officers in the course o f investigation are testimonial 
in nature. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52; see also Salt Lake City v. Williams, 2005 UT App 
493, TJ17, 128 P.3d 47 (citing cases "attempting] to define 'testimonial'"). Their 
admission is barred by the Confrontation Clause unless the witness is unavailable, and the 
defendant "had a prior opportunity for cross-examination," regardless of whether the 
hearsay is otherwise reliable. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54; see also Melendez-Diaz, 129 
S. Ct. at 2531 (holding that forensic and laboratory certificates were testimonial in nature 
and subject to Sixth Amendment confrontation protection where they were prepared 
"under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that 
[they] would be available for use at a later trial."). The Supreme Court has therefore 
made clear that "[a] witness's testimony against a defendant is thus inadmissible unless 
the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had the prior 
opportunity for cross-examination." Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531 (citing Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 51-52). 
Testimonial statements subject to the Confrontation Clause protection apply to 
statements made to police to establish events relevant to a criminal prosecution. See 
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); see also Williams, 2005 UT App 493, 
1[17 (recognizing that "testimonial" has been defined to include statements where "'a 
reasonable person . . . would objectively foresee that his statement might be used in the 
investigation or prosecution of a crime'") (further citation omitted). Although Crawford 
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did not outline a precise "definition of 'testimonial/" it made clear that "testimonial" 
"applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or 
at a former trial; and to police interrogations." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 66. And Davis 
further clarified that police reports made with an eye toward prosecution are testimonial 
in nature. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. While the Supreme Court did not "produce an 
exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements" it did recognize that 
"Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances 
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal investigation." 
Id. The Court further clarified that "statements made in the absence of any interrogation" 
can also be testimonial in nature. Id. n.l. Moreover, certificates from lab analysts 
"showing the results of forensic analyses" are testimonial in nature and protected by the 
Confrontation Clause. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2527. 
Like the certificates in Melendez-Diaz, "[t]here is little doubt" that the police 
reports indicating that the computer was stolen "fall within 'the core class of testimonial 
statements'" outlined in Crawford. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (citing 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52). Because "'a reasonable person . . . would objectively 
foresee'" that such stolen property reports would be used as part of a criminal 
investigation, the stolen property reports were testimonial in nature, implicating the 
Confrontation Clause. Williams, 2005 UT App 493, \\1 (further citations omitted). 
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Also like Melendez-Diaz, "[t]his case involves little more than the application of 
[the] holding in Crawford:' Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2542. "[T]he Confrontation 
Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses " Id. at 2540. In 
this case, the State failed to present a witness with personal knowledge as to whether the 
computer was stolen when it failed to call the person who had reported it stolen. 
Introducing the police reports of stolen property would have violated Gonzalez-
Camargo's right to confrontation; the State compounded that error by presenting the 
detective's testimony regarding what the reports said, thereby multiplying the hearsay 
and precluding Gonzalez-Camargo any opportunity for cross-examination on the issue of 
whether the computer was in fact stolen. 
When the admission of evidence violates a defendant's right to confrontation, the 
State must establish that the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Calliham, 2002 UT 86, TJ46, 55 P.3d 573. In this case, the State cannot establish that the 
error in relying on reports of stolen property to establish that the computer was stolen was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State did not present other evidence 
establishing that Appellant received any items that had been stolen. In fact, the only 
evidence aimed at establishing that property had been stolen was the detective's hearsay 
testimony and apparently a Utah State sticker on one computer. But the sticker itself 
would not establish that the computer had been stolen; the computer could have been sold 
or on loan or out for repairs. The State needed the owner or custodian of the computer to 
testify that it had been stolen. Nor did the State establish its case through the cellphones. 
While one cellphone had the picture of a girl who was the daughter of an officer's 
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neighbor, the State did not put on evidence that the phone was stolen. And, even if it had, 
the State did not tie Appellant to the cellphones. Instead, the State rested its stolen 
property case on the computers but failed to present evidence demonstrating they were 
stolen. 
Under these circumstances, the violation of Appellant's right to confrontation was 
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Although defense counsel repeatedly objected 
to the hearsay testimony, she did not explicitly address the confrontation violation. 
Nevertheless, this error can be remedied under a plain error review. See Dunn, 850 P.2d 
at 1208. 
Plain error requires reversal where "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is 
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome . . . . " Id. Because this error 
"involves little more than the application of [the] holding in Crawford (Melendez-Diaz, 
129 S. Ct. at 2532), it should have been obvious to the trial court. Melendez-Diaz, Davis, 
and Crawford make it clear that a defendant has the right to confront a person making a 
testimonial police report to police officers. The error was therefore obvious under 
Supreme Court case law. 
The error was also harmful as outlined above. Without the testimony, the State had 
no evidence demonstrating that Appellant possessed stolen property. The improper 
admission of this testimony therefore requires a new trial because without the hearsay, 
there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant/Defendant Fernando Gonzalez-Camargo respectfully requests that his 
conviction for possession be overturned and an acquittal be entered based on the 
insufficient evidence of constructive possession presented at trial. Appellant further 
requests that the conviction for receiving stolen property be reversed based on the 
improper admission of hearsay testimony that a computer was stolen, in violation of the 
rules of evidence and Appellant's right to confrontation. 
SUBMITTED this ^[ day of Au cc*sfc , 2011. 
C-cd&xt 
Joan C. Watt 
Andrea Garland 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FERNANDO GONZALEZ-CAMARGO, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 091907747 FS 
Judge: ROYAL I HANSEN 
Date: December 6, 2010 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lynettm 
Prosecutor: TAYLOR, JACOB S 
Defendant 
Defendants Attorney(s) : GARLAND, ANDREA J 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 18, 1980 
Audio 
Tape Number: S41 Tape Count: 1100-1124 
3rd Degree Felony 
CHARGES 
1. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE (amended) 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 06/30/2010 Guilty 
2. THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY (amended) - Class B 
Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 06/30/2010 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST 
C/SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE 
JOSE PENA 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST 
C/SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a 
term of 365 day(s) 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN 
PROPERTY a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a 
term of 180 day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 180 
day(s). I 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 11 day(s) previously served. 
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Case No: 091907747 Date: Dec 06, 2010 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
Deft to complete CATS and the court will consider early release 
upon completion 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
charges run consecutive 
Charge # 1 
Charge # 2 Fine: $1180.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $560.00 
Due: $1180.00 
Total Fine: $1180.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $560.00 
Total Principal Due: $1180.00 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $400.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SLCO TREASURER 
The amount of Attorney Fees is to be determined by Adult Probation 
Sc Parole. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 365 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1180.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Violate no laws. 
No contact with victim(s). 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling or 
treatment as directed by probation agency. 
Do not use, consume, or possess alcohol or illegal drugs; nor 
associate with any persons using, possessing or consuming alcohol 
or illegal drugs. 
Do not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Submit to breath and/or urine testing for drugs or alcohol upon the 
request of any law enforcement officer. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
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Case No: 091907747 Date: Dec 06, 2010 
Not to possess alcohol nor frequent places where alcohol is the 
chief item of sale. 
Obtain a substance abuse evaluation and successfully complete any 
recommended treatment. 
Obtain and maintain full-time verifiable employment and/or 
schooling. 
Participate in and complete any educational and/or vocational 
training as directed by probation agency. 
Submit to curfew, randum UA's and ankle monitor if deemed necessary 
by Adult Probation and Parole. 
CATS aftercare 
GED with in 12 months 
No contact with co-defendants, 
and/or third party 
Current child support 
AP&P to look into contact w/,child 
Date: \L 
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THE COURT: You may. , 
MS. GARLAND: I've brought you some copies of the 
Fox, and Layman, and Spanish Fork v. Brian cases, and I've 
highlighted the relevant language in all of them. I think if 
you go through - here's Fox, and then here's Layman, and 
here's Brian. There you go. 
THE COURT: All right, thanks. 
MS. GARLAND: Those set forth the law regarding 
constructive possession. And in State v. Fox, on 319 it 
says, "That constructive possession exists where the 
contraband is subject to defendant's dominion and control." 
However, it goes onto say. "Persons who might know of the 
whereabouts of illicit drugs and who might even have access 
to them, but have no intent to obtain and use the drugs 
cannot be convicted of possession of a controlled substance. 
Knowledge and ability to possess do not equal possession 
where there's no evidence of intent to make use of that 
knowledge and ability." 
And then going onto State v. Layman, that's on page 
913. I believe it's paragraph 13 with the little paragraph 
sign. Interpreting Fox, they say there must be facts which 
show that the accused intended to use the drugs or 
paraphernalia as his own. And later on in Spanish Fork v. 
Brian where they're interpreting both State v. Fox and State 
v. Layman, they're talking about a case where the Spanish 
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Fork police got a complaint that narcotics were being used a 
residence. They got a search warrant. They found contraband 
under the mattress that the defendant shared with her 
husband, and they found other items in the residence in plain 
view, including a roach clip, zig-zag papers, other 
paraphernalia. And Spanish - in Spanish Fork v. Brian, the 
court said - interpreting these prior cases with those facts. 
"Although the defendant most certainly knew of the existence 
of the items and their potential for illegal use, evidence 
must raise a reasonable inference that defendant was engaged 
in a criminal enterprise and not simply a bystander." And I 
think that those cases set forth what is required to 
establish a prima facie case of constructive possession, and 
I think - although they're talking about narcotics, the 
reasoning certainly applies to both guns and stolen property. 
Here, they're saying that Mr. Gonzalez-Camargo was brought 
into an apartment where they're saying that he said he lived, 
and they're saying that he said that he owned some laptops, 
and that's what their testimony is. The testimony from Ed 
Spann was kind of confusing. He said that - I think he said 
that Mr. Gonzalez-Camargo made some kind of a head motion 
that he interpreted as meaning the northwest bedroom. But 
even there, Your Honor, taking all that as absolutely true, 
that doesn't meet these standards that's been - that have 
been set out in - by prior courts on constructive possession. 
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1 There's no evidence that - there's - we've heard no evidence 
2 of any connection that Mr. Gonzalez-Camargo would have had to 
3 the drugs or the guns or the stolen property with the 
4 exception perhaps of some laptops. We don't know what the 
5 value of those laptops were. It's - you know, there's been 
6 no evidence as to the value of those laptops, Your Honor. 
7 Taking all the evidence in favor of the State as we 
8 must at this point, they still haven't established a prima 
9 facie case either of constructive possession or that the 
10 value of the laptops reaches $5,000. And for that reason, I 
11 would ask for directed verdicts. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you. 
13 MS. GARLAND: Thank you. 
14 THE COURT: And, Mr. Taylor, anything further from 
15 the State as well on those issues? 
16 MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor, regarding constructive 
17 possession, the facts that support constructive possession 
18 are as follows. The defendant acknowledge - himself 
19 acknowledge that the laptops were ones that he was repairing. 
20 Those were laptops that agents testified came from the 
21 northwest bedroom. 
22 On top of that, there's evidence that - he stated 
23 that he lived in the apartment with his girlfriend. He 
24 testified that his girlfriend is Jobilee Lucero. There's 
25 I evidence or there's testimony that it was her ID card that 
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1 was found in that northwest corner bedroom. If they're boy -
2 if they're girlfriend and boyfriend, it's reasonable to 
3 conclude that he's staying in that bedroom. Also the 
4 testimony that - or the evidence that he would stay there, 
5 that he took clothes there. The way that I heard it. I 
6 think all -
7 MS. GARLAND: Well, -
8 MR. TAYLOR: Hold on. 
9 THE COURT: I'm going to give you a chance to 
10 respond too. 
11 MS. GARLAND: I know it's just that the motion for 
12 directed verdict goes to the State's evidence. 
13 MR. TAYLOR: Then I'll try to limit it. 
14 THE COURT: Yeah. That's - I think that's fair. 
15 Go ahead. 
16 MR. TAYLOR: The evidence that - he told Ed - Agent 
17 Spann while he was outside that he lived in the apartment 
18 with his girlfriend. He gestured towards apartment D. When 
19 he was inside the apartment, he asked - he said - according 
20 to Agent Spann, he said, those are my laptops. I'm just 
21 repairing those. And he said that as they were bringing them 
22 out of the northwest corner bedroom. 
23 I would add to that - what I just said, which is 
24 that his girlfriend is - the woman who was arrested, Jobilee 
25 Lucer - the woman who was arrested, the woman who was wearing 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOTION FOR JUDGEMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING VERDICT 
AND TO ARREST JUDGEMENT 
Case No. 091907747 
JUDGE HANSEN 
FERNANDO GONZALEZ CAMARGO, 
Defendant. 
Defendant, by and through counsel, and pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
50(b) for a judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict in this matter. Mr. Gonzalez 
Camargo moves this Court to set aside the jury's verdict in the interests of justice and 
grant Mr. Gonzalez Camargo a directed verdict. Mr. Gonzalez Camargo moves also 
pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure for this Court to arrest 
judgement against him. 
FACTS 
1. The State charged Mr. Gonzalez Camargo with Possession of Controlled 
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Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony, Receiving 
Stolen Property with a Value of or Exceeding $5,000.00, a second degree 
felony, and Possession of a Weapon By Restricted Person, a third degree 
felony. 
2. A jury trial was held before this Court on June 29, 2010 and June 30, 2010. 
3. During the jury trial, the State put on a number of witnesses. 
4. Brandon Call, an investigator for the Attorney General's office testified that 
he performed surveillance on the apartment earlier that day. He testified 
that he witnessed several hand-to-hand transactions that appeared to involve 
persons coming out of 813 North Riverside Drive, Apartment D, in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. The transactions did not appear to involve Mr. Gonzalez 
Camargo and he was not present when they took place. 
5. The agents obtained a search warrant to enter both apartment D and 
apartment B, also on that same floor. 
6. Steven Metcalf, an investigator for the Attorney General's office, testified 
that on the date of this arrest, he performed surveillance. He and Agent 
Carolina Herrin stopped a 2002 maroon Nissan Altima driven by either 
Angel Ovaedo Araya or Leandro Ramirez, that they found a number of 
items in the car and let the individual go. 
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7. The Attorney General's office agents waited to enter the apartment because 
the Salt Lake Police Department SWAT team first secured and entered the 
apartment. SWAT performed a "surround and call-out" maneuver in which 
they brought people out of the apartment before entering. There were 
numerous people brought out of the apartment, more than a dozen. 
Attorney General's office agents attempted to find out everyone's identity 
and try to find out who lived at the apartment. At some point, Mr. Gonzalez 
Camargo was brought out of the apartment and sat on the sidewalk with 
other persons, many of which were allowed to leave. It took about two 
hours for officers to process the individuals brought out to the sidewalk. 
8. The agents testified that they took photographs of the persons on the 
sidewalk but the photos did not turn out because they did not use a flash. 
9. During this two hours, the State's witnesses testified that they found a 
juvenile male in Apartment B and brought him out with the others. They 
also found a gun in Apartment B. 
10. Ed Spann testified that Mr. Gonzalez Camargo said he lived in the 
apartment, so they brought him back into the apartment. 
11. In the apartment, in the bathroom they found torn up social security cards. 
Mr. Gonzalez Camargo's was not among them. 
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12. In the northwest bedroom they found methamphetamine in a box that 
Brandon Call thought was on a mattress. Agent Ed Spann thought the drugs 
were on the floor. The agents for the Attorney General's office were not 
present when the SWAT officers initially entered the room and located the 
drugs. No SWAT officers testified. It is therefore not known where in the 
room the SWAT officers found the drugs. 
13. Mr. Gonzalez Camargo's counsel cannot recall but believes that agents 
Spann and/or Call testified that a scale and perhaps packaging materials 
were also found in the northwest bedroom. 
14. The State presented testimony from a technician at the Utah State Crime 
Laboratory that the substance found was methamphetamine. 
15. When Ed Spann and Brandon Call entered the northwest bedroom they 
located a gun in the closet behind men's and women's clothing. Also in the 
closet were stacked laptops and a number of other items, some believed to 
be stolen. 
16. The State's witnesses testified that one of the laptops had been reported 
stolen from Utah State University. They testified that one was reported 
stolen by John Amtoft. 
17. In the other bedroom, the southwest bedroom, the State's witnesses testified 
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they found paraphernalia and a fraudulent identity card. 
18. The agents put Mr. Gonzalez Camargo in the living room while they 
removed items from the bedroom. Agent Spann testified (as may one or 
two other of the State's witnesses) that Mr. Gonzalez Camargo, upon seeing 
the computers removed from the room said words to the effect that the 
computers were his, that his job was to repair computers. 
19. The State also introduced evidence that the identification of Jovalee Lucero 
was found in the bedroom and that Ms Lucero appeared to be Mr. Gonzalez 
Camargo's girlfriend. 
20. Mr. Gonzalez Camargo testified that he did not live at the Riverside 
apartments, that he lived elsewhere, with his family. 
21. Mr. Johnny Hernandez also testified that he met with Mr. Gonzalez 
Camargo earlier that week at a different location, that he believed was Mr. 
Gonzalez Camargo's residence, and bought a car from Mr. Gonzalez 
Camargo. 
22. Mr. Gonzalez Camargo testified that he had been frequenting the Riverside 
address for about a year, that he was friends with the people there, that at 
one point, months before events giving rise to the instant case, he had even 
been arrested at that address. lie testified that he and the other people who 
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lived at or frequented the apartment liked to get together to cook meals, 
watch soccer, and socialize. 
23. At the close of the State's evidence, prior to Mr. Gonzalez Camargo's 
testimony, Mr. Gonzalez Camargo moved for a directed verdict. This Court 
returned a directed verdict on Count's I and II. This Court found no 
evidence of "intent to distribute," and therefore sent Count I to the jury as 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony. The Court 
found no competent evidence of the value of the stolen items and therefore 
sent Count II to the jury as a class B misdemeanor. . 
24. The jury returned a verdict of Guilty on Count I, Possession of Controlled 
Substance, a third degree felony and Guilty of Count II, possession of stolen 
items, a class B misdemeanor. The jury found Mr. Gonzalez Camargo not 
guilty of possession of the firearm. 
25. Mr. Gonzalez Camargo is legally here in the United States of America and 
supports children born in the United States. 
ARGUMENT 
1. This Court Should Set Aside the Jury's Verdict on Count I. 
Even examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict 
(Management Comm. of Graystone Pine Homeowners Ass'n ex rel. Owners of 
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Condominiums v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982)), the State presented 
insufficient evidence to support a conviction for Possession of Controlled Substance. 
The Utah Supreme Court set forth what evidence the State must present at trial in 
State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). 
Actual physical possession presupposes knowing and intentional 
possession. However, actual physical possession is not necessary to convict 
a defendant of possession of a controlled substance. State v. Carlson, Utah, 
635 P.2d 72, 74 (1981). A conviction may also be based on constructive 
possession. Id. In Carlson, we held that constructive possession exists 
"where the contraband is subject to [defendant's] dominion and control." 
However, persons who might know of the whereabouts of illicit drugs and 
who might even have access to them, but have no intent to obtain and use 
the drugs can not be convicted of possession of a controlled substance. 
Knowledge and ability to possess do not equal possession where there is no 
evidence of intent to make use of that knowledge and ability. 
To find that a defendant had constructive possession of a drug or 
other contraband, it is necessary to prove that there was a sufficient nexus 
between the accused and the drug to permit an inference that the accused 
had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the 
drug. 
Even in situations where the State can show that a defendant knew of the existence 
of contraband and its potential for illegal use, that does not equal possession, unless the 
State can also establish the defendant's personal intent to make use of that knowledge. 
Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 975 P.2d 501, 503 (Utah App. 1999). 
Also, even where, as in Bryan, a defendant's spouse is involved in drugs, the 
evidence "must raise a reasonable inference that defendant was engaged in a criminal 
enterprise and not simply a bystander." Id,, quoting Fox, 709 P.2d at 319-20. In State v. 
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Layman, 985 P.2d 911, 913, 1999 UT 79, }\ 13 (Utah 1999), the Utah Supreme Court 
further clarified that the evidence must show that the defendant not only knew about the 
contraband but intended to use the contraband as his own. It is not enough to say that the 
presence of paraphernalia indicates that someone intended to use the drugs; this intent 
must be specific to the defendant. Id. Even where, as in Bryan, a defendant's spouse is 
known to be involved in drugs, that spouse's involvement may not be then attributed to the 
defendant. See generally, Bryan. 
Here, drawing inferences in the light most favorable to the State's verdict, it is a 
close question as to whether Mr. Gonzalez Camargo may have known that persons 
residing or visiting at the apartment may have been involved in sales or use of controlled 
substance. Given that the drugs were found in a room also containing computers that Mr. 
Gonzalez Camargo apparently claimed as his own, it may be fair to infer that Mr. 
Gonzalez Camargo knew the drugs were there, even though the State presented no 
evidence of where the SWAT team initially found the drugs and even though many 
unknown persons were in the apartment, engaged in destroying or hiding evidence (as with 
the torn identity cards). 
Even so, assuming Mr. Gonzalez Camargo knew drugs were present, the State 
presented no evidence tending to show that Mr. Gonzalez Camargo had any intent to use 
them as his own. No fingerprints were present. No witnesses saw Mr. Gonzalez Camargo 
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personally involved in the use or physical possession of drugs. No items with Mr. 
Gonzalez Camargo5s name on them were found in the immediate vicinity of the 
contraband. Mr. Gonzalez Camargo was not drug-tested. Mr. Gonzalez Camargo, though 
searched pursuant to arrest, did not have on his person any pipes, baggies, scales, or other 
contraband tending to show Mr. Gonzalez Camargo's personal involvement with drugs. 
The State presented no evidence tending to show Mr. Gonzalez Camargo was on or about 
the date of the arrest involved in the possession of illegal controlled substance. 
As such, the State did not present evidence sufficient to show that Mr. Gonzalez 
Camargo knowingly and intentionally exercised dominion and control over controlled 
substance. 
2. This Court Should Arrest Judgment Against Mr. Gonzalez Camargo. 
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes this Court to arrest 
judgment against Mr. Gonzalez Camargo on grounds that the facts presented in the trial 
do not constitute a public offense. This Court may arrest judgment based on insufficiency 
of the evidence. State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah App. 1991), affd, 852 P.2d 981 
(Utah 1993). This Court may even arrest a jury verdict when the evidence viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict is so inconclusive as to an element of the crime that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element. Id. 
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In the instant case, the State simply failed to present evidence of Mr. Gonzalez 
Camargo's intent to exercise dominion and control over the controlled substance. There 
was no evidence presented upon which reasonable minds could conclude that Mr. 
Gonzalez Camargo not only knew the drugs were present but intended to use them as his 
own. The evidence on that point was entirely lacking. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Gonzalez Camargo respectfully requests that this Court set aside the jury's 
verdict on the issue of whether he possessed controlled substance. Alternatively, Mr. 
Gonzalez Camargo respectfully requests that this Court arrest the judgment against him. 
Although the jury found him guilty, it is hard to say why they did so, when the evidence 
was simply not present. 
DATED this '(Jo day of AUGUST, 2010. 
ANDREA J. GARLAK 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Utah Attorney Genera 
2010. 
272 South College Drive, Suite 200, Murray, Utah 84123 this 2 V ^ d a y of AUGUS' 
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1 Q (BY MR. TAYLOR) Detective Willis, are you familiar 
2 with the matter involving a stolen laptop - a laptop stolen 
3 from a Utah University employee? 
4 MS. GARLAND: Objection, hearsay. 
5 I THE COURT: Okay. 
6 MR. TAYLOR: Yes or no question, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: And I'm going to allow you to respond 
8 to that, Detective Ellis, go ahead. 
9 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
10 Q (BY MR. TAYLOR) To your knowledge, was that a 
11 laptop with a Utah State University number 100898? 
12 MS. GARLAND: Objection. 
13 THE COURT: And the basis is? 
14 MS. GARLAND: Hearsay. 
15 THE COURT: Hearsay? I'm going to have to have him 
16 tell us how he's aware of that. So you're going to have to 
17 lay some foundation with regard to that. 
18 Q (BY MR. TAYLOR) Detective Ellis, if you could just 
19 tell us how you're aware of this matter? 
20 A I received a call from -
21 MS. GARLAND: Objection. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. He can tell us he received a 
23 call. I don't want him to tell us what was the content of 
24 that call, but go ahead. 
25 Q (BY MR. TAYLOR) Now, you were saying that you 
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A 
a call from whom? 
From the Attorney General's Off 
Okay. And as a result of that 
, did you do? 
As a result of that call, I 
make, and serial number. 
what I'm 
confine 
Q 
you got 
A 
universi 
hearsay. 
MS. GARLAND: Objection. 
THE COURT: He can tell us 
asking him to do with regard 
it to that. 
(BY MR. TAYLOR) Just tell 
that call. 
I verified that a computer 
ty. 
MS. GARLAND: I'm going to 
MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor? 
was 
what 
[ to 
ice. 
call , what, if 
given the model, 
he 
that 
us what 
was 
obje 
owne 
!Ct, 
did, and that's 
So let's 
you did after 
id by the 
Judge. This is 
THE COURT: He can tell us how he knows that, and 
I'm going to allow him to proceed and to do it, and so just 
we're all aware of how we're proceeding. He's entitled to 
tell us what he did, not the conversations that you had with 
others and the process. And assuming there's a sufficient 
foundation - and I'll note that objection with regard to that 
on an ongoing basis. 
MS. GARLAND: May we approach? 
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1 THE COURT: You may. Go ahead. 
2 MR. TAYLOR: Actually, I think the next two 
3 questions might clarify this. If we could just hold off. 
4 THE COURT: Good, and that - you can ask them. And 
5 if you need to approach, I'm glad to see you both at anytime. 
6 Go ahead. 
7 Q (BY MR. TAYLOR) Detective, do you have - in your 
8 capacity as a detective for Utah State University, do you 
9 have access to Utah State University records? 
10 MS. GARLAND: May we approach, Your Honor? 
11 THE COURT: You may. The same instructions, ladies 
12 and gentlemen of the jury. Stand up and stretch if you'd 
13 like to do so. 
14 (Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
15 MS. GARLAND: That would be hearsay records, Your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
17 MS. GARLAND: Records of stolen property. That's 
18 hearsay. 
19 MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor, he's employed by Utah 
20 State University. He has access to the records. There's a 
21 specific exclusion to this in the hearsay rule. 
22 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
23 MR. TAYLOR: It's a government record. He works 
24 for the same institution. It's something that he's able to 
25 testify about. 
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MS. GARLAND: - custodian of those records. But if 
he's looking at lists of things that have been reported 
missing, that would be more along the lines of police 
reports. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, if he has even established 
that he has access to those in the ordinary course of 
business -
MS. GARLAND: He's not the -
THE COURT: - he does have -
MS. GARLAND: He's not the custodian of those 
records, though. 
THE COURT: And, you know, if he can show us that 
he has those - that access that he's entitled to them, I'm 
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going to allow him to testify regarding that. And I note the 
objection. 
MS. GARLAND: Okay. 
(End of sidebar) 
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Taylor, you can proceed. 
Q (BY MR. TAYLOR) Detective Ellis, in your capacity 
as a detective for Utah State University, do you have access 
to records regarding property that belongs to Utah State 
University? 
A Yes. 
Q And does that include stolen property? 
A Yes, it does. 
Q Okay. You testified that you received a call from 
the Attorney General's Office. Do you know if that was from 
Brendan Call - Agent Brendan Call? 
A No. That was from somebody else? 
Q Was it Carolina Erin? 
A It was Carolina. 
Q Okay. And after receiving that call, did you check 
any kind of records? 
A I verified the information that was given to me 
with the equipment manager. 
Q Okay. 
A That that computer was -
MS. GARLAND: Objection. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. And I'm going to have him 
2 testify with regard to his review as opposed to what he 
3 learned from other people, and let's lay that foundation, Mr. 
4 Taylor, on that. 
5 Q (BY MR. TAYLOR) Detective, did you -
6 If I could have one moment, Your Honor? 
7 THE COURT: You may. 
8 Q (BY MR. TAYLOR) Detective Ellis, did you - after 
9 receiving the call and after taking any other action, did you 
10 write any kind of a report - or excuse me. Did you verify 
11 that any property was stolen? 
12 A I did. 
13 Q And what was that property? 
14 A A Dell laptop computer. 
15 MS. GARLAND: I'm going to object. 
16 I THE COURT: Well, tell me the basis of what you're-
17 MS. GARLAND: May we approach? 
18 THE COURT: You may. 
19 (Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
20 MS. GARLAND: Using the word verify is just another 
21 way to get into hearsay, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: You know, what I want you to do is if 
23 you want it in, you've got to have him say what he did and 
24 the foundation that he - and lay the - and -
25 MR. TAYLOR: Well, -
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1 THE COURT: - that he was [inaudible] in. 
2 MR. TAYLOR: I think it was getting into that, but 
3 Ms. Garland objected. He spoke to somebody who also works 
4 with the university. 
5 MS. GARLAND: Hearsay. 
6 THE COURT: And hearsay, we're going to keep out, 
7 right? 
8 MR. TAYLOR: Right. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 MR. TAYLOR: But what I'm trying to get in is that 
11 he - as an employee of Utah State University, especially in 
12 his capacity as a detective, that he has access to property -
13 to records regarding stolen property. 
14 THE COURT: Ask him - lay the foundation, and then 
15 he can't testify as to what others told him, but what he did 
16 and -
17 MR. TAYLOR: Right. Well, I think he already said. 
18 I think I asked him, and I think he said - correct me if I'm 
19 I wrong - but I think he has testified that he did do - that he 
20 - subsequent from receiving a call, that he verified it 
21 through his records that he has access to that this laptop 
22 was stolen. And if I haven't - I thought I asked that. But 
23 I if I didn't, I'll ask it. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. And I think it's worth laying 
25 I the foundation, and I think your objections based on what -
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Ms. Garland, with regard to -
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
court -
THE 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
GARLAND: 
COURT: 
GARLAND: 
COURT: 
GARLAND: 
COURT: 
GARLAND: 
COURT: 
GARLAND: 
COURT: 
Hearsay. 
Okay. 
Your Honor, it's - these are out of 
I understand, and -
- recordations. 
- and I've already gone through -
- information. 
- that issue with regard to -
That's -
- the business records. If he's 
entitled to review those and utilize those in the ordinary 
course of business -
MS. GARLAND: Right, but -
THE COURT: - then he's entitled to -
MS. GARLAND: - if he's just saying I verified -
THE COURT: - testify. Yeah. 
MS. GARLAND: - that's hearsay. 
THE COURT: Well, he can tell us what he did, okay? 
MS. GARLAND: Right. 
THE COURT: So I'm going to allow to proceed on 
that basis as soon as there's an adequate foundation. 
MR. TAYLOR: I'll do my best, Your Honor. 
(End of sidebar) 
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THE COURT: Great. Okay. Mr. Taylor, you can 
proceed, please. 
MR. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. 
Q (BY MR. TAYLOR) Detective Ellis, we've been asking 
you some questions about what you - your role -
If I could just have a moment, Your Honor? 
We've been asking some questions about your access 
to records. Do you have access to various types of records 
in your capacity as a detective for Utah State University? 
A We do. 
Q Do those records include stolen record - or stolen 
- records pertaining to stolen items? Well, I'll ask it this 
way. 
MS. GARLAND: Judge, I'm going to object. 
MR. TAYLOR: I'll rephrase it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
Q (BY MR. TAYLOR) If an item is stolen - just 
hypothetically. If an item is stolen and it belongs to Utah 
State University, is there any kind of a report that's made? 
A If it occurs in our jurisdiction, we make a report 
of it. 
Q Okay. If an item belonging to Utah State 
University is stolen outside of the jurisdiction, would there 
still be some kind of a - if not a report, at least something 
- would you be notified? 
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A Sometimes we are if the person comes back and is 
told to notify us. 
Q Okay. And if that person notifies you, do you or 
does anyone else make a note of it somehow or a record of it? 
A If they talk to us, we make a report of it in our 
office, 
MS. GARLAND: And I'm going to object, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And what's the basis? 
MS. GARLAND: Your Honor, he's referring to police 
reports. 
THE COURT: Okay. And I'm going to overrule the 
objection with regard to that. Go ahead. 
Q (BY MR. TAYLOR) If someone does make a report like 
that, do you have access to such a report? 
A I do. 
Q Okay. And is that in the normal course of your 
duties? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q Okay. And as a part of your duties, can you verify 
if property is belonging to Utah State University? 
A Yes, we can. 
Q Okay. So if - hypothetically if someone reports 
property belonging to Utah State University is stolen, ' 
there's a way for you to check to see if that property 
actually belongs to Utah State University? 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (2007) 
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, 
or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange 
to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation 
of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert 
with five or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of or-
ganizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, or gam-
mahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony and 
upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree 
felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; 
or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a 
second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may 
be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the trier 
of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on 
his person or in his immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the 
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to 
ran consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony 
punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years and 
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which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and 
the person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B—Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance 
analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or 
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, 
or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement, 
vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be 
occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances 
in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged pre-
scription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 
ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third 
degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of 
the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a con-
viction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater 
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled sub-
stances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce of 
marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior 
boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 
or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree 
greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to con-
trolled substances as listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, and: 
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(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to 
a term of six months to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not 
amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in his body any 
measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, 
causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another. 
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in his body: 
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in 
Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under Schedule II is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 
58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA) is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) Prohibited acts C—Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a li-
cense number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for 
the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent 
himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or 
other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration 
of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be at-
tempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any 
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his re-
ceiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, sub-
terfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use 
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of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, 
or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under 
the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to 
print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, 
or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D—Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this 
chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 
37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled 
Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this 
Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those 
schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds 
of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which 
are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or 
institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, 
or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library; 
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii); 
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act 
occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or dis-
tribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of any 
correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3. 
(b)(i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and 
shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise 
have been established but for this subsection would have been a first degree felony, (ii) 
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Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eli-
gible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less 
than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this Sub-
section (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that of-
fense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g). 
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided 
by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one 
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting with 
the mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly solicits, 
requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to commit 
a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly 
believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was 
unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the location 
where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the 
location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B misde-
meanor. 
(6)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu of, 
any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state, con-
viction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to 
prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a 
person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a con-
trolled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so 
with knowledge of the character of the substance or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of his 
professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or adminis-
tering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an as-
sistant or orderly under his direction and supervision. 
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(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or possesses an 
imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a reg-
istered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his employ-
ment. 
(10)(a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian, as 
defined in Subsection 58-37-2(l)(v), who uses, possesses, or transports peyote for bona 
fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian 
religion as defined in Subsection 58-37-2( l)(w). 
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in Sub-
section 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was used, pos-
sessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in con-
nection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion. 
(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative defense 
under this Subsection (10) as soon as practicable, but not later than ten days prior to trial, 
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense, 
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for good cause 
shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice. 
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (10) by a 
preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to the 
charges. 
(11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or 
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without 
the invalid provision or application. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-408 (2007) 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another 
knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, or who 
conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding the property from 
the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the case of an actor 
who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the receiving offense 
charged; or 
(c) is a pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used 
or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or representative 
of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains property and fails to require the 
seller or person delivering the property to: 
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the property; 
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the bottom of the certificate next 
to his signature; and 
(iii) provide at least one positive form of identification. 
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting 
used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every agent, employee, or 
representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to comply with the requirements of 
Subsection (2)(c) is presumed to have bought, received, or obtained the property knowing 
it to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence that the de-
fendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a business dealing in or col-
lecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or was an agent, employee, 
or representative of a pawnbroker or person, that the defendant bought, received, con-
cealed, or withheld the property without obtaining the information required in Subsection 
(2)(d), then the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought, re-
ceived, or obtained was not stolen. 
(5) Subsections (2)(c), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as defined in 
Section 76-10-901. 
(6) As used in this section: 
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(a) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods. 
(b) "Pawnbroker" means a person who: 
(i) loans money on deposit of personal property, or deals in the purchase, exchange, or 
possession of personal property on condition of selling the same property back again to 
the pledge or depositor; 
(ii) loans or advances money on personal property by taking chattel mortgage security on 
the property and takes or receives the personal property into his possession and who sells 
the unredeemed pledges; or 
(iii) receives personal property in exchange for money or in trade for other personal 
property. 
(c) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on the security of 
the property. 
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UTAH R. EVID. 801 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct 
of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testi-
fying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject 
to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with 
the declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the statement or has for-
gotten, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express 
or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or 
motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the 
party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a 
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a 
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, 
or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of 
the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a 
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the con-
spiracy. 
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UTAH R. EVID. 803 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available 
as a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition 
made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while 
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the declar-
ant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, 
plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement 
of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the ex-
ecution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for 
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or 
present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or 
external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a 
witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to 
testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the 
matter was fresh in the witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If ad-
mitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be re-
ceived as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data 
compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or 
near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in 
the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of 
that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as 
shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that 
complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the 
source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institu-
tion, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not con-
ducted for profit. 
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(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 
(6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data 
compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6), to 
prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which 
a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made and preserved, 
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any 
form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or 
(B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty 
to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and 
other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the 
Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pur-
suant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances 
indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of births, fetal 
deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office pursuant to 
requirements of law. 
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record, report, state-
ment, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of 
which a record, report, statement, or data compilation in any form, was regularly made and 
preserved by a public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance 
with Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, 
statement, or data compilation, or entry. 
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages, divorces, deaths, 
legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or other similar facts of personal or 
family history, contained in a regularly kept record of a religious organization. 
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact contained in a 
certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or administered a sac-
rament, made by a clergyman, public official, or other person authorized by the rules or 
practices of a religious organization or by law to perform the act certified, and purporting 
to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time thereafter. 
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family history contained 
in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits, 
engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like. 
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a document 
purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of the content of the 
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original recorded document and its execution and delivery by each person by whom it 
purports to have been executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an applicable 
statute authorizes the recording of documents of that kind in that office. 
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement contained 
in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter stated 
was relevant to the purpose of the document, unless dealings with the property since the 
document was made have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of 
the document. 
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in existence twenty 
years or more the authenticity of which is established. 
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabulations, lists, 
directories, or other published compilations, generally used and relied upon by the public 
or by persons in particular occupations. 
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon 
cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination, statements 
contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medi-
cine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admis-
sion of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the 
statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits. 
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among members of 
a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a person's associates, or in the 
community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, 
relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or 
family history. 
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a community 
arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the 
community, and reputation as to events of general history important to the community or 
State or nation in which located. 
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among associates or 
in the community. 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial 
or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty 
of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact 
essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the prosecution in a 
criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons 
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other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect ad-
missibility. 
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries. Judgments as 
proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or boundaries, essential to the 
judgment, if the same would be provable by evidence of reputation. 
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U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
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U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indi-
ans not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for 
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Ex-
ecutive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied 
to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of 
the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the 
number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one 
years of age in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, 
or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as 
an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or 
judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have 
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the ene-
mies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such dis-
ability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including 
debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrec-
tion or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall 
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the 
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, 
obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the pro-
visions of this article. 
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